Woodson Claims: Another Nail in the Coffin
By Woodson claims are wrongful death tort actions arising from workplace injuries, typically brought outside the scope of workers’ compensation. Originating from the seminal case Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), these claims frequently arise in the context of construction accidents and involve egregious employer misconduct. Typically, parties injured at work can only bring claims under workers’ compensation, and not tort actions, such as for wrongful death. North Carolina recognizes a narrow exception that permits tort claims for workplace injuries caused by an employer’s intentional misconduct or “conduct that, while not categorized as an intentional tort, was nonetheless substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to the employee.” Valenzuela v. Pallet Express, Inc., 207 N.C. App. 364, 367, 700 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2010) (citing Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 556, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2003)).
In a recent case, Tyson v. Elg Utica Alloys, Inc., No. COA24-740, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 368 (Ct. App. June 18, 2025), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina was again forced to decide whether the facts of this case met the Woodson standard. The deceased employee was killed by an explosive fire while operating a zirconium crusher at defendant-employer’s plant. Prior to the explosion after very few fires, the defendant-employer had been cited by government authorities for various safety violations, but none of these citations were related to zirconium. Following the fatal explosion, the NC OSHA issued additional citations relating to the defendant-employer’s handling of zirconium and the crusher. The administrator of the deceased employee’s estate filed a wrongful death complaint in civil court against the defendant-employer, asserting a Woodson claim.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the facts of this case did not meet the Woodson standard as a matter of law. The Superior Court Judge denied the defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment, and the defendant-employer appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the defendant-employer conceded that their conduct may have been negligent, and perhaps even grossly negligent, but argued that it still fell short of the stringent Woodson standard. The Court of Appeals agreed, citing Whitaker:
“Simply having knowledge of some possibility, or even probability, of injury or death is not the same as knowledge of a substantial certainty of injury or death.” Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 558, 597 S.E.2d at 668-69 (emphasis added).
The Court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the employer’s conduct rose to the level of substantial certainty required by Woodson. It reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed North Carolina’s long-standing precedent of interpreting Woodson narrowly. At this point, the Woodson exception appears all but extinct. Given the consistent rejection of these claims by North Carolina courts, employers and practitioners alike should view Woodson claims as an exceedingly narrow exception — rarely viable and almost never successful.