Substantiating Charitable Giving: Sibling Rivalry?

Kim, a white woman with shoulder-length brown hair, wears a pin and orange dress and blue blazer with a small off-white flower pin. She is seated in her office. By Kimberly B. Tyson

On January 6, 2026, in Gibson v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2026-1 (a nonappealable “S” case), the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction of $188,563 for high-end cycling apparel that taxpayers donated in 2019. The court’s analysis of the appraiser regulation reminded me of Jan Brady, the middle daughter on “The Brady Bunch,” who laments the attention bestowed on Marsha, her older sister.

The court highlighted the detailed substantiation requirements for charitable contributions of property valued at over $500, including facts about acquiring the property and its basis, as well as the requirement of a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser. The court correctly held the taxpayers failed to explain adequately how the donated property was acquired, failed to provide the approximate date of acquisition, and failed to provide the cost/adjusted basis. The court also correctly noted the record did not confirm that the appraiser was a qualified appraiser. Regarding the qualified appraiser, the court cited Reg. § 1.170A-13(c). Although applicable to donations in 2019, Reg. § 1.170A-17 was ignored in favor of the one before it, just like Jan is ignored in favor of Marsha.

Does it matter? Not in this case, but it could in a different one. Both regulations generally exclude the same categories of people from being a qualified appraiser (e.g., the donor/taxpayer, a party to the transaction in which the donor acquired the property (generally), the donee, employees of the donor/taxpayer or donee, etc.). Compare Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(iv) with Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(5). Both regulations also exclude appraisers who receive prohibited fees and those barred from practice. Compare Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(D) & (iv)(D) with Reg. § 1.170A-17(b)(5)(i) & (vi). But the new and old regulations also differ. For example, Reg. § 1.170A-17 omits the exclusion in Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(ii) whereby an appraiser is not qualified if a donor knew of facts that would cause a reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to overstate the value of the donated property (e.g., the donor and the appraiser have an agreement about the amount at which the property will be valued, and the donor knows the amount exceeds the fair market value of the property). That exclusion was the basis for the disallowance of multimillion-dollar deductions in two recent syndicated conservation easement cases, Rock Cliff Reserve, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-73, and Oconee Landing Prop. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-25. Instead of a donor-knowledge exception to disqualify an appraiser, Reg. § 1.170A-17(a)(6) excludes an appraisal from being qualified if the donor either failed to disclose or misrepresented facts, and a reasonable person would expect the failure or misrepresentation to cause the appraiser to misstate the value of the contributed property.

In Gibson, the court’s failing to cite the applicable regulation did not affect the result. The point is the tax aspects of charitable giving have been greatly impacted by recent statutory, administrative, and judicial responses to the tsunami of syndicated conservation easement cases. Be mindful of these recent developments, lest you overlook Jan for Marsha.

Kimberly B. Tyson is an attorney with K. Tyson Law in Charlotte.