On August 22, 2025, the North Carolina Supreme Court filed an opinion in Devalle v. N.C. Sheriffs’ Educ. & Training Standards Comm’n. The Court’s opinion provides regulatory agencies and occupational licensing boards guidance in determining an applicant’s “good moral character” as required by statute.

The Court first recognized the requirements of “good moral character” are broad and difficult to define, but are not unconstitutionally vague and have “well-defined contours” determined by precedent. As pertaining to the matter before the Court, “[g]ood moral character has many attributes . . . none are more important than honesty and candor.” In re Legg, 325 N.C. 658, 672, 386 S.E.2d 174, 182 (1989) (citation omitted).

Here, a state trooper (“Devalle”) was found to be clocking in for work but staying home instead of going on patrol. Following an internal investigation, Devalle’s employment was terminated in August 2017. Two days after his termination, Devalle accepted a position with a County Sheriff’s Office as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer. Due to changing law enforcement agencies, Devalle was required to apply to the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standard Commission (the “Commission”) for new law enforcement certification.[1] Over the next year and a half, Devalle attempted to restore his character and reputation. However, the Commission informed Devalle they intended to deny his application because the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined Devalle lacked “good moral character.”

I. Finding the Facts

Devalle petitioned for a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings. Following a two day hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) provided the Commission with a proposed final decision. The ALJ noted Devalle’s current supervisor, the county sheriff, and the principal of the his assigned school, testified to the former trooper’s good moral character and positive reputation. However, the ALJ noted Devalle’s “lack of candor and sincerity,” that he “feigned a lack of memory or confusion,” and was “evasive and elusive even after having his recollection refreshed.” But Devalle “readily recollected [the relevant] circumstances . . . when questioned by his own counsel.” In the proposed final agency decision, the ALJ recommended the Commission deny certification based on a Class B Misdemeanor offense of “Willfully Failing to Discharge Duties,” but not for lack of good moral character.[2]

The ALJ’s proposal for decision was overruled by the Commission in its final agency decision. The Commission concluded Devalle had not demonstrated the requisite good moral character of a deputy sheriff and indefinitely denied his certification. Although the Commission acknowledged the testimony of the county sheriff and principal, noting they “provided credible and persuasive testimonies regarding [Devalle’s] rehabilitation,” the Commission believed “[Devalle’s] own conduct” at the hearing outweighed his supporting evidence.

II. A Race to the Courthouse

Devalle appealed the Commission’s decision by a petition for judicial review before the Superior Court. The Superior Court reversed the Commission’s decision, concluding Devalle “presently has good moral character” and the Commission’s decision was “unsupported by substantial evidence.” The Superior Court ruled the Commission must retroactively certify Devalle to the time of his application for certification, August 2017. The ruling by the Superior Court was upheld by the Court of Appeals, which held the standards the Commission applied arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or capriciously departed from those applied to earlier cases.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reasoning the evidentiary record supported the Commission’s decision under the whole record test. The Court determined the Commission’s verdict was not arbitrary and capricious, as there was substantial evidence in the record for the decision. The Court reasoned there was enough evidence for the Commission to conclude Devalle lacked candor and truthfulness. Further, the Court reasserted, “it is well settled that the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of particular testimony are for the administrative body to determine.” In re Legg, 325 N.C. at 671, 386 S.E.2d at 181–82 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 1, 21, 287 S.E.2d 786, 798 (1982)).

The Court stated Devalle’s evasive answers at hearing frustrated the Commission’s ability to evaluate the extent of his character rehabilitation. Just as the Court recognized in In re Willis and In re Elkins, “these types of responses are inconsistent with the commonly understood perceptions of candor and truthfulness. They constitute substantial evidence from which [the Commission] could find [Devalle] lacked good moral character.” See also In re Burke, 368 N.C. 226, 231, 775 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2015) (“Testimony that is contradictory, inconsistent, or inherently incredible is a sufficient basis upon which to deny admission on character grounds.” (quoting In re Braun, 352 N.C. 327, 335, 531 S.E.2d 213, 218 (2000)).

In its ruling, the Court reasoned the precedent cited by the Court of Appeals was distinguishable from the present case. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s final agency decision in Royall v. North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. The Court of Appeals utilized the Commission’s reasoning in that case, that due to “concerns about the flexibility and vagueness of the good moral character rule” the Commission reserved revocations of justice officer certification “for clear and severe cases of misconduct.” That court believed the Commission did not “apply the same standard” in the instant case to that of a “similarly situated individual.”

The Supreme Court found the two cases to be inapposite. In Royall, a sheriff’s deputy received information from several sources about a case that appeared to be closed. The deputy posted on social media congratulating the arresting agency. It turned out the investigation was ongoing and the deputy shared previously undisclosed details. The deputy took responsibility, cooperated with the internal review, was determined to not have jeopardized the investigation. The Commission concluded the deputy there, “at worst . . . had an honest mistaken understanding, which is insufficient to establish a lack of moral character.”

The Court here distinguished the Commission’s conclusion stating, “[Devalle’s] profound lack of candor and truthfulness while testifying under oath at his contested case demonstrated that truthfulness is still a challenge for [him].” The Court noted, “in this particular case, the profound nature of [Devalle’s] untruthfulness permeates throughout his entire testimony.”

However, the Court noted the Commission’s nonspecific conclusion of lack of candor and truthfulness could frustrate appellate review. But due to the extent of Devalle ’s lack of candor and the Commission’s specific factual findings about Devalle’s untruthfulness at hearing, the record allowed for review, even if the Commission did not expressly incorporate appropriate findings into its conclusions of law. Thus, the Court held the Commission did not impair appellate review.

III. Time is of the Essence

Finally, the Court made specific note of the relevant period from which Devalle’s character should be viewed. The Superior Court retroactively certified Devalle to his initial application date of August 2017. The Supreme Court stated, “the initial burden of proving good moral character lies with the applicant.” Therefore, the Commission must evaluate “the applicant’s character as he presented it at the time of his application.” The Court recognized Devalle may have rehabilitated his character following his application to the Commission; however, the Commission must review Devalle’s good moral character at the time of application, two days following his termination from the State Troopers.

The Court reasoned, “[i]f the applicant later seeks to supplement his application with additional evidence of good moral character, it is incumbent upon him, not the board, to offer that evidence and satisfy his burden of proof.” If a certification is granted retroactively, “it may only be awarded retroactive to the point in time at which the applicant met his evidentiary burden.” The Court went on to determine, “[t]hus, the trial court is bound by the evidentiary record before it. It may not consider new evidence, like [Devalle’s] post-hearing conduct, that [Devalle] did not present at the hearing and [the Commission] did not evaluate.” The Court continued, “had [Devalle] successfully demonstrated his good moral character there, [the Commission] should have certified him retroactive to December 2019, the point at which he satisfied his burden of proof.”

IV. Credibility is Always at Issue

In conclusion, the Court makes clear an administrative agency may make determinations of an applicant’s “good moral character” at the time of application based upon the evidence presented by the applicant. An agency may use the applicants own testimony and demeanor to determine the applicants candor and truthfulness. For the safety of the public, the burden of proof is on the applicant to convince the reviewing Board the applicant is qualified for the license sought. The Board must assess the applicant’s qualifications at the time of application, and it is the applicant’s burden to supplement their application to clarify or improve any shortcomings.

An agency may decide if the responses of the applicant are consistent with the common understanding of candor and truthfulness. The agency must determine the weight evidence carries based on the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of any particular testimony. For the benefit of the public, it is by the agency’s discretion whether the information presented demonstrates the requisite good moral character or constitutes substantial evidence from which the agency could find the applicant lacking.

V. Practice Tips

To establish a record for review, agencies denying an application for licensure should consider making detailed findings of fact that directly connect to conclusions of law.
An agency’s review of an applicant’s own testimony may create substantial evidence to deny an application.
An agency must review an applicant’s good moral character based on the evidence presented at the time of application.
It is the applicant’s burden to establish good moral character before an agency.
As determined by an individual agency’s procedures, an applicant may supplement their application with evidence created since the time of application of good moral character.

[1] The North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standard Commission certifies sheriffs and sheriffs’ deputies as justice officers – as opposed to the Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission, which certifies police officers and state troopers as criminal justice officers.

[2] See generally N.C.G.S. § 150B-40(e) (2023) (when certain agencies are unable or elect not to hear a contested case, they may request an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to preside over a contested hearing as the hearing factfinder and provide the agency a proposal for decision, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The agency may adopt or amend the proposal for decision prior to issuing a final agency decision.)

September 3, 2025/by Administrative