Voting Rights After a Criminal Conviction: An Examination of North Carolina Law
In North Carolina, the voting rights of individuals with prior criminal convictions are set forth in the State Constitution and General Statutes. This article examines the historical development of North Carolina law defining those rights, constitutional challenges to statutory provisions, and the effect of different convictions on voting eligibility.
I. The Development of North Carolina Law
In Richardson v. Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an affirmative sanction for felony disenfranchisement. That section excepts disenfranchisement for “participation in rebellion, or other crime” from its provision reducing a state’s congressional representation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that California could, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, exclude individuals from voting even after they had completed their felony sentences and paroles. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1–2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–56 (1974).) Federal appellate courts have also upheld exclusions during felony imprisonment and parole when rejecting equal-protection challenges to distinctions among individuals convicted of felonies. (See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 26–28 (3d Cir. 1983) and Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010).)
In Hunter v. Underwood, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied to the misdemeanor offenses at issue because racial discrimination motivated the provision’s enactment and the provision continued to have a discriminatory effect. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not permit the purposeful racial discrimination in the enactment and operation of Section 182 of the Alabama Constitution, and it violated Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S. Ct. 1916 (1985).)
Laws governing voting after a criminal conviction vary by state. Vermont permits otherwise qualified individuals to vote by absentee ballot while incarcerated, using their last voluntary residence as their residence for voting purposes. Colorado permits otherwise qualified individuals to vote during felony parole. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 807 (Lexis Advance through Act 179 [except Act 170] and M-12 of the 2026 Adjourned Session of the 2025-2026 Vermont General Assembly [which includes provisions current through June 16, 2026 as well as additional acts], but not including all edits to be made by the Office of Legislative Counsel as part of the codification process) Vermont provides for voting by early voter absentee ballot in primary and general elections and prohibits using the place of involuntary confinement as the individual’s voting residence; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-2-103 (Lexis Advance through all legislation enacted by the Seventy-fifth General Assembly at its Second Regular Session in 2026). The North Carolina Supreme Court traced the State’s express constitutional felony exclusion to the amendments to the North Carolina Constitution adopted by the 1875 constitutional convention and ratified by voters in 1876. The later North Carolina constitutional revision approved by voters in 1970 and effective July 1, 1971, retained felony disqualification and established the present categories for criminal disqualification: a felony against North Carolina or the United States, or another state’s felony that would also be a felony in North Carolina. (N.C. Const. art. VI, § 2(3); Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, 384 N.C. 194, 200–02 (2023) [recounting the 1875 amendments, their ratification in 1876, and the 1971 revision].) A federal or North Carolina felony conviction therefore disqualifies an individual until restoration; a felony conviction in another state does so only if the offense would also be a felony in North Carolina. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55(a)(2).)
Restoration of citizenship rights historically required a separate judicial proceeding. In State v. Currie, the North Carolina Supreme Court described the procedure preceding the 1971 legislation as ordinarily requiring a two-year wait after discharge, a petition, three months’ notice, and a hearing before a North Carolina Superior Court judge. Five respectable witnesses who had known the applicant for the three years preceding the petition had to establish the applicant’s good character for truth and honesty during that period. The North Carolina Superior Court could restore citizenship rights upon being satisfied by that showing. (State v. Currie, 284 N.C. 562, 564 (1974) [describing the pre-1971 restoration procedure]; See Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 201 [describing waiting-period exceptions for certain pardons, suspended judgments, and training-school discharges].)
The General Assembly repealed that procedure in July 1971 and substituted three grounds for restoration: a recommendation by the Department of Correction at release; the passage of two years after release by the Department of Correction, including probation or parole, without another state or federal criminal conviction; or an unconditional pardon. An eligible individual still had to take an oath before a judge affirming that one of those conditions had been satisfied. The oath also required a promise to support and abide by the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, as well as the North Carolina Constitution and state laws to the extent they were not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution and federal laws. (Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 902, §§ 1, 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1421. Section 1 of the 1971 act required the oath before a judge of the General Court of Justice in Wake County, the county of residence, or the county of the individual’s last conviction. The act took effect upon ratification on July 16, 1971.) In 1973, the General Assembly eliminated the oath requirement and provided for restoration upon unconditional discharge, an unconditional pardon, or satisfaction of all conditions of a conditional pardon. Section 13-2(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes continues to require the agency or court having jurisdiction to issue a certificate or order documenting unconditional discharge and restoration and to transmit the original to the appropriate clerk for filing with the conviction record. (An Act to Provide for the Automatic Restoration of Citizenship, ch. 251, §§ 1, 3, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 237, 237–38; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-2(a).)
2. Current Eligibility and the Individual Criminal Record
Charges, misdemeanors, and juvenile adjudications
Under current North Carolina law, a charge is distinguished from a conviction. An arrest or pending felony charge does not itself satisfy the North Carolina constitutional requirement that an individual be “adjudged guilty” of a felony before losing the right to vote. An otherwise qualified individual awaiting trial does not lose voting rights merely because the pending charge is a felony. A separate disqualifying felony conviction for which rights remain unrestored can still make that individual ineligible. (See N.C. Const. art. VI, § 2(3); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55(a)(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1.)
The North Carolina Constitution and Section 163-55(a)(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes limit disqualification based on a criminal conviction to qualifying felonies. An otherwise eligible individual convicted of a North Carolina misdemeanor therefore retains the right to vote, even while incarcerated for that offense. Current guidance from the North Carolina State Board of Elections confirms that a North Carolina misdemeanor conviction does not remove voting rights for an otherwise eligible individual, even during incarceration for that misdemeanor. (See N.C. Const. art. VI, § 2(3); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-55(a)(2); N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System.)
Juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a criminal conviction. Section 7B-2412 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that an adjudication of delinquency “shall neither be considered conviction of any criminal offense nor cause the juvenile to forfeit any citizenship rights.” (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2412.)
Felony sentences and restoration
For an individual convicted of a North Carolina felony, the ordinary route to restoration is “unconditional discharge.” Section 13-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes applies that condition to an inmate, probationer, parolee or defendant under a suspended sentence. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1).) Release from prison can precede unconditional discharge because a felony sentence may include a period of supervision. Section 15A-1368(a)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes defines post-release supervision as the period before termination of the maximum prison term during which a sentenced prisoner is released under the governing statutory rules and conditions. The North Carolina State Board of Elections guidance requires completion of felony post-release supervision before restoration through discharge. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1368(a)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1; N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System.) A felony sentence consisting of probation also requires unconditional discharge. The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts provides a separate restoration order for defendants unconditionally discharged from unsupervised probation. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1); N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Order of Restoration of Citizenship [Unsupervised Probationers or Fine-Only Sentences], AOC-CR-926 [rev. Jan. 2022].)
The date of discharge can differ from the originally scheduled expiration of probation. Under Section 15A-1342(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, a court may terminate probation early and discharge the defendant when the defendant’s conduct and the ends of justice warrant it. That authority could permit an early unconditional discharge to restore voting rights before the original probation period ends. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1342(b); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1). Section 15A-1342(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes early termination and discharge; Section 13-1(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides for restoration upon unconditional discharge.) If probation is validly extended under Section 15A-1342(a) or Section 15A-1344(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes, the individual remains ineligible while that felony probation continues. (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1342(a), -1344(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1); N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System. Section 15A-1344(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes permits an extension for good cause after notice and hearing, subject to the limits in Section 15A-1342(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes.)
Discharge is not the only route to restoration. For North Carolina convictions, an unconditional pardon or satisfaction of all conditions of a conditional pardon also restores citizenship rights. North Carolina law does not require expungement, and the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts’ restoration order states that restoration does not expunge, reverse, or conceal the record of conviction. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1)–(3); see also N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Order of Restoration of Citizenship.) The official restoration forms specify that restoration applies only to the convictions they identify and does not extend to rights still forfeited because of another conviction. Accordingly, completing one felony sentence does not establish eligibility if a separate disqualifying felony sentence remains incomplete. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-2(a)–(b); N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Order of Restoration of Citizenship, Note to Defendant; N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Certificate of Restoration of Citizenship [Out-of-State or Federal Conviction], AOC-CR-919, Note to Restored Citizen [rev. Jan. 2022]. Both forms expressly limit restoration to rights forfeited because of the listed convictions.)
Unpaid obligations
The North Carolina State Board of Elections guidance distinguishes outstanding debt from continued felony supervision. Under that guidance, voting rights are restored when felony supervision ends even if fines, fees or restitution remain unpaid; an individual whose probation has been extended for nonpayment remains ineligible. (N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 13-1(1), 15A-1342(a), -1344(d).) The distinction applies, for example, to unpaid restitution. An individual who has been unconditionally discharged from felony probation may register and vote despite unpaid restitution, assuming no separate disqualification. An individual whose felony probation continues under a valid extension for nonpayment remains ineligible while that probation continues. The outstanding balance alone does not determine eligibility. (See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1(1); N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System; N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Order of Restoration of Citizenship. The form distinguishes restored citizenship rights from outstanding civil obligations arising from the criminal case.)
3. Challenges to Restoration and Criminal Enforcement
Completion of felony supervision
In Community Success Initiative v. Moore, the plaintiffs challenged Section 13-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes under the North Carolina Constitution’s equal-protection, free-elections, and property-qualification provisions. The North Carolina Supreme Court described the action as a facial challenge to the restoration statute; the plaintiffs did not challenge the North Carolina Constitution’s felony disqualification itself. (Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, 384 N.C. 194, 197, 204–05, 213 (2023); N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 10–11, 19.) On March 28, 2022, Wake County Superior Court entered a final judgment enjoining the defendants from preventing registration or voting because of felony probation, parole or post-release supervision. The judgment permitted otherwise eligible individuals who were not incarcerated for a felony conviction to register and vote. (Final Judgment and Order at 64, Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, No. 19 CVS 15941 [N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2022], rev’d, 384 N.C. 194 (2023); Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 205 [quoting the trial judgment’s operative eligibility provision].)
The legislative defendants appealed. On April 26, 2022, the North Carolina Court of Appeals issued a partial writ of supersedeas staying the injunction for the May 17 and July 26 elections in 2022 and directed the North Carolina State Board of Elections to implement the judgment for subsequent elections. On May 4, 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed discretionary review before the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided the appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Wake County Superior Court’s judgment on April 28, 2023. (Order, Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, No. P22-153 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2022); Order, Cmty. Success Initiative v. Moore, No. 331PA21 (N.C. May 4, 2022); Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 205, 240. The discretionary-review order was certified on May 6, 2022. The legislative defendants appealed; the State Board and its members did not. Id. at 204 n.5.) Viewing the evidence through the presumption of legislative good faith, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not shown racial discrimination to have been a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the 1971 repeal and replacement of Section 13-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes or the 1973 amendments to that statute. (Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 216–17, 221–24, 229.) On the wealth-based equal-protection claim, the majority applied rational-basis review and held that the legislature could reasonably associate satisfaction of financial obligations with responsible voting and financial responsibility for an offense. It also rejected the property-qualification and free-elections claims. (Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 233–35, 237–40.) The North Carolina Supreme Court remanded for dismissal with prejudice. The North Carolina State Board of Elections current guidance states that restoration through discharge requires completion of felony supervision and that debts remaining after supervision ends do not themselves prevent restoration. (Cmty. Success Initiative, 384 N.C. at 240; N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System.)
Criminal liability for voting before restoration
Separate litigation in federal court addressed the statute criminalizing voting before restoration. In North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, the plaintiffs filed suit in 2020 challenging the then-current version of Section 163-275(5) of the North Carolina General Statutes (the “Challenged Statute”), alleging violations of equal protection and due process. (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 730 F. Supp. 3d 185, 189–90 (M.D.N.C. 2024); N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 155 F.4th 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2025). The plaintiffs were the North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute and Action NC.) While the action was pending, the General Assembly added an express knowledge requirement. For elections held on or after January 1, 2024, the amended version (the “Amended Statute”) makes it a Class I felony for an individual disqualified by a criminal conviction to vote “knowing the right of citizenship has not been restored in due course and by the method provided by law.” (Act of Oct. 10, 2023, S.L. 2023-140, §§ 38, 50; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-275(5).)
On April 22, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Challenged Statute, holding that it violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 730 F. Supp. 3d at 189–90, 202–03, aff’d, 155 F.4th 298 [4th Cir. 2025]. The district court used “Challenged Statute” to refer to Section 163-275(5) (2019) and directed its injunction to that version.) The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ fair-notice argument but held the Challenged Statute void for vagueness because it lacked sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. The District Court identified undisputed evidence that some district attorneys understood the Challenged Statute to require knowledge of ineligibility, while others prosecuted voters without evidence of intent. (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 730 F. Supp. 3d at 201–02.)
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the statutory amendment had not rendered the case moot. The defendants acknowledged that prosecutions for pre-2024 conduct remained possible. In explaining why the case was not moot, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that continued prosecutions under the Challenged Statute “would likely have a chilling effect on voter registration” in the communities they served. The evidence cited by the Fourth Circuit included accounts of eligible individuals afraid to register or vote and of the plaintiff organizations diverting time and resources from registration and turnout activities to reassure those individuals. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs retained a concrete interest in the litigation because relief against continued enforcement could prevent that interference with their work. (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 155 F.4th at 307–08.)
On the merits, the Fourth Circuit treated the racially discriminatory purpose of the 1877 enactment and the 1899 reenactment as undisputed. The defendants did not contest that racial discrimination motivated either enactment or that the Challenged Statute continued to affect Black North Carolinians disproportionately. In holding that the Challenged Statute violated equal protection, the Fourth Circuit relied on the history of the criminal prohibition as a measure designed to disenfranchise Black men and its essentially unchanged reenactment in 1899. (Id. at 304–05, 310–13; N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 730 F. Supp. 3d at 194. The district court recorded the defendants’ acknowledgment that they lacked evidence disputing the discriminatory intent of the 1877 enactment and the 1899 reenactment. The Fourth Circuit likewise treated that intent and the continuing disproportionate impact as undisputed.)
The defendants argued that changes resulting from the 1971 North Carolina Constitution created “a legally significant historical break” between the nineteenth-century enactments and the Challenged Statute. They contended that the Constitution’s expansion of the convictions causing disenfranchisement to include federal and qualifying out-of-state felonies also changed who could be prosecuted under the Challenged Statute and removed its earlier discriminatory character. The Fourth Circuit held that the changes had “no bearing on the discriminatory intent behind the Challenged Statute,” rejecting what the district court had called the “indirect cleansing theory.” The constitutional provision determined which convictions caused loss of voting rights, but the 1971 revision neither amended nor reenacted the separate criminal prohibition. The Fourth Circuit found “no direct, substantive change to the Challenged Statute itself since 1899” and identified the 1899 General Assembly as “the legislature responsible for the operative form of the Challenged Statute.” (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 155 F.4th at 303–04, 310–12.)
The Fourth Circuit affirmed solely on equal-protection grounds. It expressly declined to address the district court’s separate due-process holding that the Challenged Statute was void for vagueness because it lacked sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. On September 12, 2025, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and permanent injunction. (N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 730 F. Supp. 3d at 202–03, aff’d, 155 F.4th 298 [4th Cir. 2025]; N.C. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 155 F.4th at 313 & n.9. The district court’s injunction addressed the Challenged Statute. The Fourth Circuit affirmed solely on equal-protection grounds and expressly declined to decide the separate due-process issue.)
4. Restoration Records and Registration
The records documenting restoration are separate from the application to register. For a qualifying discharge from a North Carolina felony sentence, the responsible agency, department, or court must issue a certificate or order showing unconditional discharge and restoration. Section 13-2(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes requires the original to be transmitted to the clerk of the General Court of Justice in the county where the conviction record is filed; the clerk then files it with that record without charge. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-2(a).) For a federal or other-state conviction, the clerk in the individual’s North Carolina county of residence issues the certificate upon a showing by the individual or a representative that the individual has been unconditionally discharged by the agency having jurisdiction, received an unconditional pardon or satisfied the conditions of a conditional pardon. The statute accepts “any paper writing” from the federal or other state agency that had jurisdiction if it shows that the conditions of Section 13-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes have been met. (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 13-1(4)–(5), -2(b).)
After restoration, the State Board directs individuals to register again even if they were registered before conviction. They remain subject to the generally applicable registration requirements. (N.C. Const. art. VI, § 3(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-82.4(a), (c), -82.6(d), -82.6B(a)–(b); N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Registering as a Person in the Criminal Justice System; N.C. State Bd. of Elections, Register in Person During Early Voting.) Restoration shortly before an election receives separate treatment. An individual who becomes qualified following restoration after a felony conviction between the twenty-fifth day before an election and Election Day may submit a registration application on Election Day to a member of the county board of elections, the county director of elections, or the chief judge or a judge of the precinct where the individual is eligible to vote. The official who receives the application decides eligibility and, if the application is approved, the individual may vote that day. The applicant must present written or documentary evidence of identity; the official may request further evidence of qualification if in doubt. If the official denies the application, the individual may cast a challenged ballot and may appeal the denial to the full county board of elections. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.6(f), (g)(1). A challenged ballot is marked and sealed in a separately numbered envelope under Section 163-88.1(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Registration on the day of a second primary requires qualification arising between the first and second primary.)
5. Conclusion
North Carolina law governing voting after a criminal conviction has changed over time. Constitutional revisions, legislative amendments and recent challenges reflect the subject’s continuing legal and political significance. Understanding this history helps explain the current legal landscape and the considerations that may influence future changes or further challenges.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It should not be relied upon as legal authority. Individuals with criminal records should conduct their own research to evaluate their voting eligibility under the law.
Zachary Westmoreland is a North Carolina State Bar Certified Paralegal who has supported attorneys across the practice areas of corporate, tax, estate planning, and real estate finance. Zachary is committed to advancing the legal profession and currently serves on the Board of the Raleigh-Wake Paralegal Association and the Council of the North Carolina Bar Association Paralegal Division. He also serves on multiple NCBA Paralegal Division committees, including as a Co-Chair of the Professional Responsibility Committee.
He earned a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. During his undergraduate studies, he also completed UNC’s ABA-approved Paralegal Certificate Program. Upon completion of his bachelor’s degree, he became a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Zachary remains actively involved in pro bono and nonprofit initiatives throughout North Carolina, and he is dedicated to providing the highest level of client service and maintaining a strong commitment to continued legal education and professional development.
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