Halili v. Ramnishta, Court of Appeals, September 1, 2020 (UCCJEA, inconvenient forum)

Mother, Father, and minor child lived in New York, but visited North Carolina in late June 2017 in anticipation of moving here – they were here for 11 days. They then returned to New York where they stayed until August, and they moved to North Carolina. After they moved here, the parties’ second child was born. In January 2018, Mother and both minor children moved to New York; Father stayed in North Carolina. Father initiated a custody action in North Carolina and Mother initiated a custody action in New York. The North Carolina court dismissed Father’s action after determining that North Carolina was not the home state of the older child and that North Carolina was an inconvenient forum for custody litigation concerning the younger child. Father appealed.

Regarding the trial court’s determination that North Carolina was not the home state of the older child, Father argued that the trial court erred by conflating “residency” with statutorily required inquiry into where the child “lived” with her parents for the six months prior to the filing of the action. Father contended that the parties and the older child began living in North Carolina in June 2017, and the return to New York was a “temporary absence” whereas Mother contended that the parties’ visit to North Carolina in June 2017 was a vacation and that they did not begin to reside here until August 2017. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not use language regarding “residency” in a jurisdictional sense, but instead used that language simply to resolve the factual dispute about where the child lived at what time. Because Father did not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the nature of the parties’ visit to North Carolina in June 2017 or regarding the actual move here occurring in August 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that North Carolina was not the home state of the older child.

Regarding the trial court’s determination that North Carolina was not a convenient forum for litigation concerning the younger child, Father argued the trial court erred by (1) considering factors that occurred after the complaint was filed and (2) failing to find it was in the younger child’s best interests for North Carolina to decline jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Father’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s decision because:

Section 50A-207 allows a trial court to decline to exercise jurisdiction at any time if it determines that North Carolina is an inconvenient forum. Because the statute allows the trial court to act at any time, it “necessarily follows that the trial court is not limited to considering whether North Carolina is an inconvenient forum only at the time of a plaintiff filing its complaint . . .”
Father’s argument that the trial court must make a finding of best interests was based upon case law decided under the UCCJA, which provided that the trial court must consider the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. The UCCJEA does not have that language, so no “best interest” determination is required.

Ray v. Ray, Court of Appeals (unpublished), September 1, 2020

The trial court entered an equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees order. Husband appealed and argued the trial court erred in its equitable distribution order by (1) not properly valuing real property, (2) not properly considering the pre-marital portion of his pension, and (3) ordering a distributive award; erred in its alimony order by (1) relying upon a a prior year’s bankruptcy filing to determine his income and (2) failing to make findings of his expenses and ability to pay; and erred in its award of attorney’s fees by failing to make adequate findings of fact.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the equitable distribution order as follows:

The trial court valued real property at $0.00 based upon testimony that the mortgage balance was pretty much the full value of the home – the trial court did not actually make a finding of the amount owed on the mortgage. That was error – the trial court needs to explain how it determined the value was $0.00.
Husband did not present evidence of the pre-marital value of his pension, so there was no error.
The trial court failed to make adequate findings that the presumption of an in-kind distribution had been rebutted. The trial court also failed to make adequate findings as to whether Husband had sufficient liquid assets from which to pay a distributive award.

The Court of Appeals reversed the alimony award because:

Although a court may rely upon a prior bankruptcy filing to support a finding of income, the court still has to make a finding of current income.
Even though Husband did not appear and present evidence at the trial, Wife still had the obligation to provide evidence of Husband’s ability to pay.

The Court of Appeals reversed the attorney’s fees award because the trial court did not make any findings as to the nature and scope of legal services, the skill and time required.

Even though the opinion is unpublished and so has no precedential value, knowing that parties do often cite to unpublished cases, Judge Stroud wrote a concurring opinion primarily for the purpose of cautioning against reliance upon this case. Judge Stroud noted that there are many odd and unresolved issues in the case that are not explained by the record, e.g., both parties claimed the other was incompetent, both parties are elderly and infirm, and there are multiple bankruptcies and the two adult sons who may or may not have the parties’ best interests at heart.

September 30, 2020/by FamilyLaw